Chinese traditional philosophy regards dialectics as a style of reasoning that focuses on contradictions and how to resolve them, transcend them or find the truth in both. Compromise is considered to be one possible way to resolve conflicts dialectically. In this paper, we formalize dialectical reasoning as a way for deriving compromise. Both the definition of the notion of compromise and the algorithm for dialectical reasoning are proposed on an abstract complete lattice. We prove that the dialectical reasoning is sound and complete with respect to the compromise. We propose the concrete algorithm for dialectical reasoning characterized by definite clausal language and generalized subsumption. The algorithm is proved to be sound with respect to the compromise. Furthermore, we expand an argumentation system to handle compromise arguments, and illustrate that an agent bringing up a compromise argument realizes a compromise based justification towards argument-based deliberation.
INTRODUCTION
Argumentation in artificial intelligence, often called computational dialectics, is rooted in Aristotle's idea of evaluating argumentation in a dialogue model (Hamblin, 1970) . In contrast, there exist various definitions of dialectics in history (Rescher, 2007) and it leads to various interpretations in various areas today. For instance, psychologist Nisbett interprets dialectics as a style of reasoning intended to find a middle way (Nisbett, 2003) , some logicians as formal logic disrespecting the law of noncontradiction (Carnielli et al., 2007) , and some computer scientists as the study of systems mediating discussions and arguments between agents, artificial and human (Gordon, 1995) . In particular, Nisbett pointed out that there is a style of reasoning in Eastern thought, traceable to the ancient Chinese, which has been called dialectical, meaning that it focuses on contradictions and how to resolve them or transcend them or find the truth in both. His experiments showed that, compared with Westerners, Easterners have a greater preference for compromise solutions and for holistic arguments, and they are more willing to endorse both of two apparently contradictory arguments. Moreover, he contrasted a logical approach and a dialectical approach for conflicting propositions, and pointed out that the former one would seem to require rejecting one of the propositions in favor of the other in order to avoid possible contradiction, and the latter one would favor finding some truth in both, in a search for the Middle Way. We think that the perspective opens up a new horizon for argumentation in artificial intelligence, especially in argument-based deliberation and negotiation, because argumentation is a prominent way for conflict detection, social decision making and consensus building, and the latter two cannot be achieved without such kinds of thought. However, there is little work on computational argumentation directed to dialectical conflict resolution we mentioned above.
In this paper, we formalize dialectical reasoning as a way for deriving a compromise. This is based on the knowledge that a compromise is a possible way for realizing dialectical conflict resolution, and our idea that compromise mechanisms should be calculated through reasoning mechanism. We give a formal definition of compromise and an algorithm for dialectical reasoning both on an abstract complete lattice. We show that the algorithm is sound and complete with respect to the compromise. We propose a concrete and sound algorithm for dialectical reasoning characterized by definite clausal language and generalized subsumption on the assumption that arguments are constructed from knowledge bases. We expand the argumentation system (Prakken, 1997) to handle compromise arguments and illustrate that compromise arguments realize compromise-based justification towards argumentation for deliberation. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a motivational example of dialectical thought and Section 3 shows preliminaries. Section 4 defines a notion of compromise and Section 5 proposes both abstract and concrete algorithms for dialectical reasoning. Section 6 expands an argumentation system and illustrates the effectiveness of compromise arguments. Section 7 discusses the related works, and Section 8 describes the conclusion and future works.
MOTIVATIONAL EXAMPLE
Let us consider the simple deliberative dialogue by which agents A and B try to decide which camera to buy. They are assumed to have their individual knowledge bases from which they make arguments. The worst situation for them is assumed that they cannot buy any camera.
A : I want to buy 'a' because it is a compact and light camera.
We cannot buy 'a' because it is out of stock.
B : I want to buy 'b' because it is high-resolution camera with a long battery life. 
PRELIMINARIES
A complete lattice is a 2-tuple of a set and a binary relation of the set. Both of them are abstract in the sense that the internal structures are unspecified. The abstract argumentation framework (Dung, 1995) , denoted by AF, gives a general framework for nonmonotonic logics. The framework allows us to define various semantical notions of argumentation extensions that intended to capture various types of nonmonotonic consequences. The basic formal notions, with some terminological changes, are as follows.
Definition 2. (Dung, 1995) An argument is justified with respect to AF if it is in every preferred extension of AF, and is defensible with respect to AF if it is in some but not all preferred extensions of AF (Prakken and Sartor, 1997) .
The argumentation system (Prakken, 1997 ) uses Reiter's default logic (Reiter, 1980) for defining internal structures of arguments and defeat relations in AF.
The language consists of a first-order language L 0 and a set of defeasible rules ∆ defined below. Informally, L 0 is assumed to be divided into two subsets; one is the set F c of contingent facts and the set F n of necessary facts. A default theory is a set F c ∪ F n ∪ ∆ where F n ∪ F c is consistent. We extract some necessary definitions of the argumentation system (Prakken, 1997) .
Definition 3. (Prakken, 1997) • Let ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ n , ψ ∈ L 0 . A defeasible rule is an expression of the form • Let ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ n , ψ ∈ L 0 . Defeasible modus ponens, denoted by DMP, is an inference rule of the form 
For argument A, ϕ is a conclusion of A, denoted by ϕ ∈ CONC(A), if ϕ is a first-order formula in A. ϕ is an assumption of A, denoted by ϕ ∈ ASS(A), if ϕ is an assumption of a default in A.
• Let A 1 and A 2 be two arguments.
⊥ and A 2 is defeasible and A 1 is strict.
In the definition of defeasible rule, special symbol ∼, called weak negation, is introduced in order to represent unprovable propositions. It makes that the language of the system has the full expressiveness of default logic. In DMP, assumptions in defeasible rules are ignored, and the ignorance can be correctly disabled by undercutting. An argument is a deduction incorporating default reasoning using defeasible rules and DMP ∈ R . R is assumed to consist of all valid first-order inference rules plus DMP. We say that an argument is strict if there exist only valid first-order inference rules in the argument. Otherwise, the argument is defeasible. Symbols ⊥ and ⊢ represent a logical contradiction and a logical consequence relation, respectively. Rebutting caused by priorities of defeasible rules is excluded from original definition.
Definition 2 takes no account of the aspect of proof theory that gives a way to determine whether an individual argument is justified or defensible. We extract some necessary definitions of the proof theory for argumentation system, called the dialectical proof theory (Prakken, 1999) .
Definition 4. (Prakken, 1999) 
FORMALIZING DIALECTICAL REASONING FOR COMPROMISE-BASED JUSTIFICATION
• A dialogue is a finite nonempty sequence of moves The condition 1 in the definition of a dialogue requires that the proponent begins and then the players take turns. Condition 2 prevents the proponent from repeating moves and condition 3 and 4 are burdens of proof for P and O. In the definition of a dialogue tree, all defeaters for every arguments of P are considered. The idea of the definition of win is that if P's last argument is undefeated, it reinstates all previous arguments of P that occur in the same branch of a tree, in particular the root or the tree. It is proved that arguments are justified iff the arguments are provably justified (Prakken, 1999) .
SEMANTICS FOR REASONING
In this section, we give a declarative definition of reasoning. Figure 1 shows the classification of our conflict handling modes into 5 groups (Thomas, 1992) . The vertical and the horizontal axes represent the strength of assertiveness and that of cooperativeness, respectively. Competition, collaboration, avoiding, and accommodation are explained as assertive and uncooperative mode, assertive and cooperative mode, unassertive and uncooperative mode, and unassertive and cooperative mode, respectively. Compromise is a mode taking the middle attitude among the four. In terms of importance in computational argumentation, we focus on the notion of compromise and give more concrete interpretation that compromise is a statement satisfying each agent's statement at least partly, not completely. Our idea here is that we formally define the notion of compromise using a complete lattice. We impose two conditions, incompleteness and relevance, as fundamental requirements to be compro-
Figure 1: Two-dimensional taxonomy of conflict handling modes (Thomas, 1992 
Definition 5 says that there is no compromise among X i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) if their common lower element is only bottom. Intuitively, the condition states that there is no common ground among X i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The incompleteness states that Y is not upper than X i , for all X i . The relevance states that there exists a common nonbottom greatest lower bound of {X i ,Y }, for all X i . The collaborativeness states that the common lower element of all X i is also lower than Y and the simplicity states that any lower element of Y is common lower element of Y and X i . 
, and B is a compromise between ¬A ∧ B and A.
DIALECTICAL REASONING

Abstract Dialectical Reasoning
In this section, we give a procedural definition of dialectical reasoning that derives compromise. As with the definition of compromise, the algorithm is formalized on an abstract complete lattice < L, >. The algorithm describes common procedures with which each concrete dialectical reasoning complies.
The inputs of Algorithm 1 are X 1 , ..., X n ∈ L. Algorithm 1 calculates a set of lower elements of each is abstract. One of the algorithms with the concrete procedures for dialectical reasoning will be given in Algorithm 2. In Algorithm 1, we assume that these derivation and the comparison are computable, i.e., there exist algorithms that can return the right answers to the procedures at lines 4, 6, 12 and 16. 
Theorem 1 (Soundness and Completeness). Let <
, ..., X n , Z ∈ L that satisfy inf{X i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ≁ ⊥.X i such that Y i ≁ ⊥,Y i inf{X j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, and Z ∼ sup{Y i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Now we let W i ∼ Y i . Since Z ∼ sup{W i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and X i W i , inf{X i , Z} W i . Since inf{X i , Z} W i and W i ≁ ⊥, inf{X i , Z} ≁ ⊥ for all X i . Therefore, relevance holds. Since inf{X i , Z} W i and W i inf{X j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}, inf{X i , Z} inf{X j | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} for all X i . Therefore, collaborativeness holds. Since Z inf{X i , Z} for all X i , Z sup{inf{X i , Z} | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. On the other hand, since Z ∼ sup{W i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} and inf{X i , Z} W i for all X i , Z sup{inf{X i , Z} | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. Hence, Z ∼ sup{inf{X i , Z} | 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
Concrete Dialectical Reasoning
We give a concrete and sound algorithm for dialectical reasoning characterized by definite clausal language and generalized subsumption. Generalized subsumption is a quasi-order on definite clauses with background knowledge expressed in a definite program, i.e., a finite set of definite clauses. It is approximation of relative entailment, i.e., logical entailment with background knowledge, and it can be reduced to ordinary subsumption with empty background knowledge (Nienhuys-Cheng and de Wolf, 1997). The readers are referred to (Buntine, 1988) for the definition.
Let L 1 be a definite clausal language, such that L 1 has finite constants, finite predicate symbols and no func- Under the restriction for L 1 we impose, there exists a finite least Herbrand model on L 1 and it is computable by fixed operator T P (Emden and Kowalski, 1976) . We assume the results of the operator.
The computation at line 4 in Algorithm 2 is equivalent to the computation of Y from X i and B, such that 
Consider the following two clauses and the background knowledge.
• 
user-Friendly(c), camera(c), resolution(c, high), battery(c, long)}
We let σ 1 = {x/d} and σ 2 = {x/e}. Then, the least Herbrand models N i of B ∪Y − σ i are as follows.
• •
By similar evaluation, Z turns out to be a consequence of the dialectical reasoning.
In this paper, we focus on defining a concrete and sound algorithm for dialectical reasoning, and we do not address the problem with the search space reduction using various biases. We assume the results of Example 2 in the next section.
COMPROMISE-BASED JUSTIFICATION
Handling Compromise Arguments
In contrast to reasoning about what to believe, i.e., theoretical reasoning, reasoning about what to do, i.e., practical reasoning, is closely-linked to agents' goals or desires because it depends not only on their beliefs, but also on their goals. We assume that agents have their common goal G described by a first-order formula with zero or more free variables. Obviously, compromise should be effective only in practical reasoning. In order to handle compromise arguments in the argumentation system, we distinguish practical arguments from theoretical arguments based on whether the arguments satisfy a agents' common goal or not. An argument is called practical if it satisfies agents' common goal, and otherwise it is called theoretical.
Definition 6 (Practical Argument). Let G be a goal and A be an argument. A is a practical argument for G if there exists a ground substitution α such that
A ground substitution is a mapping from a finite set of variables to terms without variables. We expand the notion of compromise into practical arguments. A compromise argument is a practical argument that uses dialectical reasoning. The rebutting and the undercutting shown in Definition 3 can be viewed as theoretical in the sense that the grounds of conflicts are logical contradiction. On the other hand, practical arguments conflict each other due to the existence of alternatives. Such practical conflict occurs when they satisfy a same goal in different ways. We define the notion of defeat based on the three perspectives: the rebutting, the undercutting and the existence of alternatives.
Definition 8 (Defeat). Let G be a goal and A and B be distinct arguments. A defeats B iff
• A rebuts B and B does not rebut A; or • A undercuts B; or • Both A and B are practical 
An Illustrative Example
We detail the motivational example about camera decision in Section 2. Both agents A and B are assumed to have their common goal G ≡ buy(x) ∧ camera(x) and the following individual knowledge bases, de-
only deductive reasoning, DMP, and dialectical reasoning on < D,≥ B > can be used for constructing arguments. Agents construct arguments only from their own individual knowledge bases with opponent's arguments previously stated. They advance argumentation by constructing dialogue trees whose roots are practical arguments, which means that they try to justify their own practical arguments for G straightforwardly. For readability, we express arguments using proof trees to visualize the reasoning. Deductive reasoning, DMP, and dialectical reasoning are expressed by '-,' '· · · ,' and '= =,' respectively. Following A 1 , A 2 and A 3 , that A 2 strictly defeats A 1 and A 3 defeats A 1 , form a dialogue tree.
A 2 : ¬inStock(a) ¬inStock(x) → ¬buy(x) ¬buy(a) 
RELATED WORKS
The prime difference between dialectical reasoning and inductive or abductive reasoning is that whereas the consequence of dialectical reasoning satisfies incompleteness, given in definition 5, inductive and abductive hypotheses satisfy completeness. Moreover, dialectical reasoning differs from deductive reasoning in the sense that the consequences of dialectical reasoning are not necessarily deducible. For instance, in Example 1, Z is not a semantical consequence of B ∪ {X 1 , X 2 }, although Z is a compromise between X 1 and X 2 . However, if the complete lattice is characterized by satisfiability relation, then any compromise is a semantical consequence of the premises. Nonetheless, dialectical reasoning has significance because neither of other reasoning mechanisms address what compromise is and how agents infer compromise.
In (Amgoud et al., 2008) , the authors introduce the notion of concession as an essential element of argument-based negotiation. They define concession as a given offer supported by an argument that has suboptimal state in argumentation. Thus, in contrast to our approach, concession is not realized by reasoning mechanism. Similarly, game theory does not address the rational generation of a new option although it gives the way for rational choices. In (Sawamura et al., 2003) , the authors introduce seven dialectical inference rules into dialectical logic DL and weaker dialectical logic DM (Routley and Meyer, 1976) in order to make concession and compromise from an inconsistent theory. The authors, however, do not show an underlying principle of these rules. Further, contrary to the philosophical opinion (Sabre, 1991) , the set of the premises of each inference rules is restricted to logical contradiction. In contrast, we give the underlying principle of dialectical reasoning by defining abstract reasoning on a complete lattice. Further, as shown in Example 2, we do not restrict the premises to contradiction.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
We defined compromise on an abstract complete lattice, and proposed a sound and complete algorithm for dialectical reasoning with respect to compromise. Then, we proposed the concrete algorithm for the dialectical reasoning characterized by definite clausal language and generalized subsumption. The concrete algorithm was proved to be sound with respect to the compromise. We expanded the argumentation system proposed by Prakken (Prakken, 1997) to handle compromise arguments, and illustrated that a compromise argument realizes a compromise-based justification towards argument-based deliberation. We plan to elaborate more applicable algorithms by incorporating language and search biases into our algorithms. Furthermore, recently, some kinds of practical reasoning are proposed for argument-based reasoning (Bench-Capon and Prakken, 2006) . However, there is little work that focuses on the relation between phases of argumentation and reasoning. Especially, compromise should be taken at the final phase of deliberation or negotiation. We will enable agents to use appropriate reasoning depending on the phase of argumentation.
